117-358-D Network-Centric Cognition

From Platform-Centric Intelligence to Governed Cognitive Mission Systems

The transition is not merely from one intelligent agent to many intelligent agents. It is from individual capability, to coordinated teamwork, to mission-configured, network-supported, and independently governed cognitive operations. Networking increases capability—and creates new forms of systemic dependency and instability.

Prologue — The Aircraft Is Not the Air Campaign

1. Imagine a highly capable F-16 taking off with an experienced pilot, effective sensors, weapons, and a clearly defined assignment. The aircraft may be competent within its local operating envelope.
2. Now imagine a formation of F-16s: coordination, task distribution, and mutual support expand the possible mission.
3. Finally, imagine a wider networked operation in which different generations of fighters, uncrewed aircraft, airborne early-warning platforms, satellites, communications assets, and ground-based intelligence services contribute to one operational undertaking. The operational unit is no longer adequately described by the aircraft in view.

This progression illuminates a similar transition in AI.

1. An autonomous agent can reason and act.
2. A multi-agent system can distribute tasks and coordinate.
3. A network-centric cognitive mission can draw on heterogeneous, persistent, and independently governed capabilities while remaining subject to explicit mission identity, protective oversight, and wider-field stability controls.

The analogy is architectural, not a proposal to militarize commercial AI.

1. Stage One — Platform-Centric Intelligence

At Stage One, the principal unit of engineering is the individual actant. Its competence depends on its model, memory, tools, sensing, authority, and local control mechanisms. Like a capable fighter aircraft, it can execute demanding work while remaining bounded by the quality of its own information and resources. A strong platform can still suffer from stale references, ambiguous commands, limited situational awareness, and loss of support.

This stage should not be caricatured as primitive or entirely disconnected. Existing autonomous agents often use APIs, tools, and external information. The defining emphasis is that mission effectiveness and safety are predominantly assessed at the individual agent or application boundary.

2. Stage Two — Multi-Agentic Systems

A formation or squadron introduces division of labor, shared tactics, role specialization, and coordination. Similarly, a multi-agent system can delegate research, negotiation, planning, and execution to different participants. A Quarterback-like orchestrator may coordinate activities and manage progress. Teams may be transient, membership may change, and specialized agents may be reused.


PARALLEL VIEW: USAF NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS ⟺ NETWORK-CENTRIC COGNITION
Same Mission Logic — From Military Operations to Governed Cognitive Missions
USAF NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS (NCO)
Integrated Air, Space, Cyber, and ISR Operations
NETWORK-CENTRIC COGNITION (GUDIYA)
Governed AI Missions for the Three-Layer AI-Economy
Actant: Platform
• Aircraft, UAV, AWACS, Satellite
• Onboard mission systems
• Sensor–shooter–comms node
Escort / Protective
• EW, threat monitoring, IFF
• Airspace & conflict deconfliction
• Self-protection & abort
Actant: AI Agent
• Purpose-built intelligent agent
• Task execution with GCID
• Operates within Grid policies
Cognitive Escort (CEA)
• Independent monitoring
• Detects drift & instability
• Can pause, slow, or abort
Mission Package
• Coordinated assets (air/space/cyber)
• Tasked for a defined objective
• Formed, executed, and retired
Persistent Assets
• Long-lived ISR platforms
• Shared data & common picture
• Theater awareness (JOC)
Cognitive Strike Package
• Goal-oriented, multi-agent team
• Temporary or persistent package
• Defined scope, boundaries, and guards
Persistent Headless Agents
• Long-lived, infrastructure-grade
• Shared services, data, and models
• Maintain continuity & context
C2 / Mission Orchestrator
• Mission planning & tasking
• Asset synchronication
• Dynamic re-tasking & risk control
Quarterback (Mission Orchestrator)
• Mission intent & decomposition
• Assembles and coordinates actants
• Monitors progress, risk, and stability
USAF NCO Grid
Networked Military Missions with Command, Control, and Assurance
GUDIYA Stability Grid
Networked Cognitive Missions with Protective Governance
THREE-LAYER MISSION ARCHITECTURE (USAF)
THREE-LAYER AI-ECONOMY (COGNITION)
Layer 1 – Warfighter UX
Pilot, operator, and mission apps (Mission intent and execution)
Layer 1 – UX: Agentic + e-Commerce
Customer intent, AI assistants, transactions, and service requests
Layer 2 – Enterprise Mission Systems
C2, ISR, intelligence, logistics, mission data, and coordination
Layer 2 – Enterprise Systems of Record
Orders, routing, manifests, tracking, contracts, and authoritative state
Layer 3 – Physical & Operational Resources
Aircraft, satellites, weapons, fuel, bases, personnel, and sustainment
Layer 3 – Physical & Economic Resources
Aircraft, hubs, sorting, trucks, inventory, people, fuel, and delivery execution
COMMON OUTCOME:
✅ Coherent Operations
✅ Stability Under Disruption
✅ Resource Integrity
✅ Mission Assurance at Scale

But cooperation alone does not establish collective stability. Several agents may each satisfy their local policy while jointly exhausting a budget, amplifying retries, or acting on the same corrupted reference. The unit of analysis must expand from individual competence to the interactions and couplings among agents.

3. Stage Three — Network-Centric Cognition

Network-centric cognition is a proposed GUDIYA operating paradigm in which the mission draws upon a distributed system of capabilities rather than merely a co-located team. Functional actants, Quarterback orchestration, Cognitive Escort Actants (CEAs), long-running headless services, external reference providers, and Grid governance participate through explicit relationships. Their locations, execution modes, ownership domains, and lifecycles may differ.

The analogy is to a networked operation that combines fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, emerging sixth-generation concepts, collaborative uncrewed aircraft, AWACS, satellites, and ground-based support. Such capabilities are not necessarily in the same formation, under the same commander, or at the same stage of deployment. Their contribution is coordinated through mission-specific permissions and interfaces.

Stage	Military analogy	Cognitive architecture	Primary design concern
1. Autonomous	Single capable F-16	Individual actant	Local competence and bounds
2. Multi-agentic	Coordinated F-16 formation	Specialized team and orchestrator	Team coordination and coupling
3. Network-centric	Distributed multi-domain mission	Governed Cognitive Strike Package + supporting network + Grid	Federated stability, authority, dependencies

4. Platform Superiority Is Not System Superiority

Improving a single platform can improve local performance without improving the whole system. A faster or more capable model may generate decisions at a rate that shared transaction services or physical resources cannot sustain. A squadron of excellent aircraft still needs reliable information, communication, logistics, and mission-level coordination. Likewise, model intelligence does not automatically confer field-wide awareness or safe collective behavior.

The engineering objective shifts from maximizing each actant's isolated performance to achieving acceptable mission outcomes under coupled constraints, partial information, and failures. That requires explicit measurements of propagation, common-mode exposure, authority integrity, and recoverability.

5. The Cognitive Strike Package as the Mission Unit

GUDIYA's proposed 'Cognitive Strike Package' (117-359-D Cognitive Strike Package) is the mission-configured operational unit. The GCID identifies the governed undertaking. A separate Mission Package-ID identifies a particular versioned execution configuration. The Quarterback coordinates the mission; functional actants perform assigned work; the CEA supplies independent local protective oversight. The external Grid governs wider-field interactions and offers bounded stabilization.

The triad is a separation of functions, not necessarily a rigid three-person command hierarchy. A small mission might implement lightweight protective controls without a dedicated language-model escort. A large mission may have several Quarterbacks and distributed CEAs, with explicitly bounded scopes and escalation rules.

Function	Primary question	Identity and governance
Quarterback	Are we accomplishing the mission?	Actant-ID; orchestration grants
Functional actants	Can we execute assigned work?	Actant-ID; mission participation
Cognitive Escort	Are we inside the safe operating envelope?	Independent Actant-ID; protective mandate
GUDIYA Grid	Is this package compatible with field-wide stability?	Federated governance and intervention authority

6. The Network Extends Beyond the Visible Team

The satellite analogy is especially illuminating. A spacecraft may support multiple operations without joining each aircraft formation. In GUDIYA, a headless, persistent actant can provide monitoring, reference validation, reconciliation, or resource intelligence across several GCIDs. It need not have a browser, a continuous model-inference loop, or exclusive membership in a package.

Three relationship types must be distinguished: organic package composition, attached mission support, and independently governed external dependencies. Mission participation does not imply ownership or unlimited command. A shared supporting service may be indispensable to many packages, making its failure a cross-mission stability concern.

7. Identity, Membership, and Runtime Are Separate

A persistent Actant-ID is not an execution-instance ID. Neither is identical to a browser session, credential, or GCID. The package manifest must preserve these distinctions so that restarting a service, rotating a token, or transferring work does not erase mission lineage. A long-running agent may be dormant while its mission participation and unresolved obligations remain valid.

Two counts are therefore needed: registered package participants and currently executing instances. A third useful count is consequentially authorized participants—those currently permitted to create or modify obligations. These populations can differ dramatically. The Grid must monitor the third even when the second is small.

Manifest field	Why it matters
GCID / Package-ID / manifest version	Mission continuity and configuration provenance
Actant-ID / role / participation ID	Who participates and in what capacity
Execution instance and mode	Interactive, headless, scheduled, event-driven, replicated
Delegation and Persistent Actant Lease	Bounded authority and expiration
CEA coverage and Grid attachment	Protective readiness and external support
Dependency and obligation references	Cross-mission exposure and consequence closure

8. Network-Centric Cognition Requires Federated Authority

An airborne early-warning aircraft, satellite, or ground intelligence service may support several operations without becoming subordinate to each strike leader. The corresponding GUDIYA rule is that a Quarterback may

request an authorized capability without acquiring the right to reconfigure or commandeer the provider. Federated trust requires scoped assertions, audience restrictions, service-level commitments, and explicit failure behavior.

The Cognitive Identity Graph therefore records more than connections. It records the source and limits of authority, the period of participation, the provenance of evidence, and the consequences of actions. GCID identifies the mission; Actant-ID identifies the participant; Mission Package-ID identifies the execution configuration; cross-domain interaction identifiers can link permitted shared transactions without exposing root GCIDs indiscriminately.

9. The EA-6B Prowler and Independent Protective Escort

The EA-6B Prowler analogy introduces a mission-attached protective capability distinct from the mission leader. Its GUDIYA counterpart, the CEA, watches the package's internal stability and security-relevant interactions. It can detect conflicting delegations, synchronized retries, unexpected participant spawning, stale references, and unsafe concentration of authority.

The escort is not a cognitive jammer (indiscriminate interference with other agents could create additional instability). A defensive escort should instead use approved measures: flagging, throttling, isolation requests, bounded commitment holds, and escalation. Its protective mandate must be independently auditable and must not be disabled unilaterally by a Quarterback pursuing throughput.

10. The Rock Climber and the External Belay

The networked package is the fully equipped climber: it possesses coordination, functional competence, local safeguards, and mission-specific protective resources. The external GUDIYA Grid is the belay system. The belay does not climb for the climber; it offers independent protection and recovery support when intrinsic capabilities prove insufficient.

The analogy also establishes limits. A rope is not proof of safety unless anchors, attachment, belayer, and device are fit for purpose. Likewise, Grid attachment cannot be reduced to network reachability. Connectivity, reference freshness, valid authority, observability, and intervention readiness must all be assessed. Neither a competent package nor an external Grid is infallible.

THE FULLY EQUIPPED NETWORKED 'CLIMBER'

The Cognitive Strike Package climbs through its own competence: Quarterback coordination, functional actants, embedded safeguards, and independent CEA protection. Persistent headless actants and federated services provide distributed support beyond the visible team. The GUDIYA Grid holds the external belay, providing wider-field awareness and bounded stabilization. The climber must be equipped to climb; the belay must be fit to protect; shared dependencies must be understood before ascent.

11. The B-59 Lesson: Local Intelligence Without Wider Context

The Soviet submarine B-59 episode during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates a different failure mode: a capable local crew, incomplete external context, and high-consequence authority. Historical accounts differ on some details of the near-launch, but the general governance lesson is clear: local concurrence does not guarantee accurate global situational awareness. A disconnected cognitive package may retain local reasoning and internal checks while lacking information about simultaneous external actions.

GUDIYA should therefore define bounded disconnected-operation modes. The CEA cannot invent missing field-wide knowledge. Restoration of communications must trigger reconciliation and, where warranted, Cognitive Airworthiness assessment before unrestricted operation resumes.

12. Network Effects Can Be Destabilizing

Network-centric capability is not a free safety improvement. Shared services create common-mode exposure. If one inventory-monitoring actant publishes corrupted data, dozens of otherwise well-behaved packages may react together. If a common gateway slows, automated retries may amplify the load. If one credential broker fails, multiple missions may lose authorized access simultaneously.

The Grid must distinguish propagation pathways: informational, operational, authority, resource, and stability coupling. Cross-mission observability should prioritize causal evidence, reference diversity, and concentration of dependencies, while preserving privacy and jurisdictional boundaries.

13. Integration with the Three-Layer AI-Economy

Network-centric cognition does not operate in an abstract agent-only world.

In the three-layer AI-Economy,

- Layer 1 is the UX Layer (with Agentic UX and e-Commerce UX). A governed mission may begin through agentic discovery and transfer to human checkout at a Human Commitment Gate.
- Layer 2 is the shared enterprise commerce and systems-of-record core.
- Layer 3 comprises physical and economic resources, fulfillment, and settlement.

Networked agents may generate proposals at machine speed, but enterprise commitments must respect transaction integrity, service capacity, and resource availability. The Grid's stability role includes observing admission pressure, retries, outstanding obligations, and physical feedback delays. A mission is not closed merely because its visible agents stop or its browser session ends.

Layer	Network-centric concern	Illustrative control
L1 UX	Agentic/human handoff, mission continuity	GCID, bounded delegation, Human Commitment Gate
L2 Systems of Record	Burst demand, duplicate commitments, contention	Admission budgets, idempotency, reconciliation
L3 Resources	Capacity, inventory, fulfillment lag	Allocation evidence, resource margins, obligation closure

14. Dynamic Package Composition and Requalification

A mission package changes during execution: agents spawn, retire, fail over, or become dormant; shared services join and leave; protective coverage may be reassigned. A versioned manifest must capture these changes. Newly spawned actants require independent identity, bounded grants, explicit participation, and appropriate protective coverage before consequential execution.

A significant disturbance may justify a post-instability fitness-for-service assessment. The affected population includes persistent memory, delegated descendants, credentials, outstanding obligations, and shared dependencies—not just currently active processes. The GCID survives to preserve accountability even when execution authority is suspended.

15. A Minimal Experimental Demonstrator

A useful experiment should compare three configurations performing the same procurement task:

- a single capable agent;
- a coordinated multi-agent team; and

- a network-centric package with Quarterback, independent CEA, headless monitoring, explicit mission identity, and Grid oversight. The third configuration must not receive unfairly superior task data or computing resources unless those differences are measured as part of the intervention.
- Introduce delayed acknowledgments, shared-reference corruption, burst demand, agent replacement, Grid disconnection, and common supporting-service failure. Measure mission completion, duplicate commitments, false intervention, detection delay, propagation reach, recovery cost, unresolved obligations, and governance overhead. The framework's benefits remain hypotheses until tested against strong conventional controls.

16. Design Rules for the Stability Architect

A Stability Architect should define the mission's authority envelope, package roles, dependency perimeter, participation semantics, protective coverage, and closure conditions before consequential admission. Each external support capability should have an identified provider, trust boundary, evidence quality, and degraded-mode response. A graph view is useful for topology; an append-only event history is necessary for reconstructing how that topology changed.

No single database, model, or central command service should be assumed to have complete truth. The architecture should combine authoritative local records, scoped cross-domain attestations, and uncertainty-aware stability estimates. Protective enforcement must remain available at appropriate local boundaries when central services are delayed or unreachable.

17. The Research Boundary

Network-centric warfare is an analogy, not empirical proof that network-centric cognition is superior. Many existing multi-agent systems already implement orchestration, shared tools, tracing, and resilience. GUDIYA must demonstrate incremental value in identity continuity, cross-mission stability, protective independence, and consequence reconciliation. Its proposed Grid, CEA, GCID, and Cognitive Airworthiness constructs should be described as architectural research until independently validated.

NETWORK-CENTRIC COGNITION

A consequential cognitive mission may be executed by a dynamically composed system of heterogeneous actants, protective escorts, persistent headless support, and federated services. Its GCID shall preserve mission identity; its Mission Package-ID shall identify the versioned execution configuration; and its authorized relationships shall preserve provenance, authority, and obligation lineage. The GUDIYA Grid shall provide wider-field observability and bounded stabilization without substituting for intrinsic mission competence. Network attachment shall not be presumed to guarantee stability.

NETWORK SUPPORT AND DEPENDENCY

A supporting actant or service may contribute to multiple Cognitive Strike Packages without becoming the property or subordinate of any one package. Composition, support, and dependency relationships shall be separately identified and governed. Common-mode dependencies, degraded communications, and shared-reference failures shall be treated as first-class stability risks.

Epilogue — The Mission Is Greater Than the Platform

The solitary fighter, the coordinated squadron, and the network-supported mission illustrate a progression in the unit of engineering. Individual capability remains indispensable. Team coordination adds leverage. But the widest operational capability emerges when heterogeneous resources can contribute under legitimate authority and when the resulting network is engineered to withstand its own dependencies.

For GUDIYA, the decisive ambition is not to make every agent more powerful. It is to make consequential cognitive missions identifiable, composable, protectable, accountable, and recoverable across the wider field. The future may be shaped not only by the intelligence inside each actant, but by the quality of the governed system through which actants operate together.